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ABSTRACT 
In March 2000, New Zealand began the development of a national Oceans Policy 
which aimed to introduce a new policy framework aimed at ecosystem based, 
integrated oceans management. Integration across sectors (such as fishing, 
aquaculture, indigenous affairs) has proved difficult. The Oceans Policy was to be 
released in late 2003 but in July 2003 the policy development process ceased until an 
ongoing dispute between Maori and the Crown over title to coastal land and water 
was resolved. In November 2005 New Zealand’s Environment Minister announced 
that work on the oceans policy process had recommenced. This paper analyses 
developments in New Zealand oceans governance identifying the interaction between 
state, community and market as important influences that can help explain 
complexities of policy development, lack of sectoral integration and a change in 
policy direction. 
 
Introduction 
New Zealand’s jurisdiction spans over 3 million kms2 of ocean (Mansell 2004, 3), 
following its declaration of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 1978. New 
Zealand ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention) in July 1996, with this ratification taking effect on 18 August 1996.  New 
Zealand has an extensive coastline, in excess of 15,000 km in length, with this 
maritime domain encompassing a ‘coastal environment ... of rich diversity within 
relatively low-productivity seas’ (Rennie 1993, 151).  
 
This domain is the source of significant cultural and historical value, as well as a 
resource for Maori (New Zealand’s indigenous people) and Pakeha (non-indigenous, 
Europeans). The proximity of the coast to New Zealanders, ‘[w]ith no town further 
than 120 kilometres from the coast it is natural that it should hold many ... special 
places; places of particular significance culturally, the whai tapu of the Maori, and 
similar windows to the Pakeha’s much shorter past’ (Rennie 1993, 151). This 
attachment to the oceans and coasts has helped shape New Zealand’s response to 
ocean governance. 
 
New Zealand has undertaken a relatively stormy ‘voyage’ in relation to creating a 
national oceans policy (Mansell 2004). A policy development process was established 
with Cabinet imprimatur that recognised, explicitly, Maori interests and relationships 
with the ocean as an important policy consideration. This process was noteworthy for 
its bottom-up focus on stakeholder and community engagement, overseen by an 
advisory committee chaired by a former New Zealand Governor-General.  New 
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Zealand’s Oceans Policy was to be released in late 2003, however, in July of that year 
before the target date the process stalled. Issues regarding the ownership of the 
foreshore and seabed that had emerged in ongoing disputes between Maori and the 
Crown needed to be resolved. This matter was re-ignited following a Court of Appeal 
decision ‘which ruled that Maori are entitled to seek exclusive title over the foreshore 
and seabed in the Maori Land Court’ (Mansell 2004, 7). A government decision to 
legislate to overcome the consequences of this decision with the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004 stalled the oceans policy process. It was not until November 2005 
that the Minister for the environment announced that work on New Zealand’s oceans 
policy had recommenced (Ministry for the Environment 2007). 
 
New Zealand faces similar challenges in oceans management to other states yet it has 
a very different constitutional framework and has used different policy tools to 
address these challenges (see Vince 2005, 2008). New Zealand has a unitary political 
system, but with a strong focus on regionalism. A uni-cameral parliamentary 
representative democracy based on the Westminster system, New Zealand has no 
formal written constitution, being one of three countries in the world in this situation 
(Parliamentary Library 2005). New Zealand’s governance framework is also 
distinguished by the influence of the Treaty of Waitangi, negotiated between the 
British and Maori in 1840.  While there has been ongoing debate over the translations 
of the Treaty, and over the interpretation of its key articles it nonetheless has 
‘acquired some permeating influence in New Zealand law’ (Parliamentary Library 
2003, 18). Of particular importance to Maori is the link to sea and resources found in 
Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi.  This article has been subject to differing 
interpretations, but the ‘orthodox position is that the Treaty guarantees in Article II to 
protect the exclusive possession and rangatiratanga over lands, forests, fisheries and 
taoanga are not enforceable in New Zealand law unless provided for in statute’ 
(Parliamentary Library 2003, 18). At the same time, however, New Zealand Courts 
‘will not ascribe to parliament an intention to permit conduct inconsistent with the 
Treaty of Waitangi’ (Parliamentary Library 2005, 2).  The Treaty of Waitangi and 
Maori interests in coastal and marine environments and resources have been a 
significant factor in contemporary ocean governance in New Zealand.  
 
The New Zealand system of government has resulted in an oceans regime that is free 
from provincial or state jurisdictional conflicts that are prevalent in Canada and 
Australia (Vince 2005, 2008), yet differences between ocean resource sectors and 
primacy placed on indigenous peoples interests in coastal and marine environments 
and resources issues have been a source of contention in development of New Zealand 
oceans governance. This paper analyses the developments in New Zealand ocean 
governance by first examining fisheries management and then the development of a 
national oceans policy. It identifies the interaction between state, community and 
market as important influences in policy development and begins by examining these 
modes of governance. 
 
Governance: Government, Market and Community  
Governance is more than government and involves a number of instruments and 
actors, ‘encompassing norms, institutional arrangements and substantive policies’ 
(Miles 1999, 1). Rhodes commented in seminal article in 1996 that the ‘search for 
new tools’ is a key element of the new governance (Rhodes 1996, 666), as indicated 
by use of market-based instruments in addressing public policy problems. In oceans 
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governance, as in other policy areas, these market-based tools are diverse and include 
transferable quotas in fisheries, user fees and charges for resource users, and the 
external certification of products and processes. Co-management arrangements – or 
more broadly based community forms of governance – are also important and have 
been promoted as alternative means to address regulatory failure.  
 
It is important to note that neither market nor community governance, while promoted 
as means to efficiently overcome regulatory failure, are a complete replacement for 
regulation, the most common form of government action. Regulation, market and 
community are not mutually exclusive approaches. Indeed effective market or 
community approaches are based on appropriate legislative and regulatory 
instruments.  
 
Market instruments are those that introduce pricing, as well as dynamics of supply 
and demand, as a means of allocating access to resources.  The use of tradeable rights 
and the creation of quasi-market approaches by such ‘trades’ in fisheries management, 
for example, have provided an alternative paradigm for both fishers and fisheries 
managers. In the 1990s the New Zealand government increased the use of economic 
instruments, chiefly through the introduction of individual transferable quotas, fishing 
rights and focus on resource rent recovery.  Other market instruments include user 
fees and charges, increasingly used in areas such as marine parks (Haward and Wilson 
2000).  It also includes use of certification and labelling of fisheries through non-state 
market-based instruments such as eco-labels (Gale and Haward 2004, Potts and 
Haward 2007). 
 
Supporters of market approaches to governance argue that if left alone markets will 
indeed get to an equilibrium point, while critics argue that conditions can arise in 
which markets fail and lead to sub-optimal outcomes (Larmour 1997, see also Dietz, 
Ostrom and Stern 2003). While the models of governance provide useful insights into 
aspects of public policy development and implementation, there are also limitations of 
single models.  While the concept of model failure provides a way in which to 
appreciate the dynamics of governance it is also important to recognise that real world 
policy making may well involve mixing of the models, legislation is enacted to 
establish user pays arrangements which have the effect increasing the interest of those 
users of the goods or services or resources and increases their sense of community and 
encourages cooperative or self management (see, generally, McCay and Acheson 
1987, Pretty 2003). 
 
This invites a reassessment of the tragedy of the commons thesis that has had 
significant influence on oceans management. The tragedy of the commons first 
identified the negative consequences of individual action, and second, focused on 
regulatory and/or market regimes as solutions to the tragedy caused by individual self-
interest (see Hardin 1968). Concerns over exploitation of stocks increasingly led to 
fisheries management ‘solutions’ which cast regulatory arrangements and government 
control as the only means of protecting fish stocks and controlling fishers. 
Underpinning this view of fishery management was ‘a polarised view of the world, in 
line with Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons”: fishers were seen as selfish profit 
maximisers, versus regulators as protectors of the resources. This perspective, 
although flawed, actually became self-fulfilling’ (Charles 1997, 108). As a result 
fishers, excluded from decision-making processes, had few incentives to moderate 
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catches. Simply speaking they were seen as rapacious maulers of the commons unable 
or unwilling to reduce their desire for short-term profit over the need for long-term 
sustainability of stocks in the fishery. As a consequence government regulation was 
needed to control fishing. This approach dominated fisheries management 
arrangements but in what is a classic case of regulatory failure was less successful in 
restricting effort and catch levels in fisheries. 
 
The possibility of an alternative solution to those proposed by Hardin has already 
been suggested. Increased support for co-management derives, first, from a 
reappraisal of view of the inevitability of a tragedy of the commons and second from 
the recognition of the limits of government action. A number of writers have re-
appraised Hardin’s pessimistic prognosis for the commons. Berkes, Feeney, McCay 
and Acheson used a number of brief examples to show ‘that success [in managing the 
commons] can be achieved in ways other that privatisation or government control’ 
(Berkes et al 1989, 91), and point out that ‘[c]ommunities dependent on common-
property resources have adopted various institutional arrangements to manage those 
resources, with varying degrees of success in achieving sustainable use’ (Berkes et al 
1989, 91). These arrangements can in fact be quite complex, as shown in studies of 
community rights-based fishing arrangements in different parts of the world (see 
Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 1997, Yamamoto and Short 1992, Charles 1997, Haward et al 
2003).  
 
One important aspect of community involvement relates to the role of the fishing 
industry itself.  Seeing the industry as a community provides important theoretical and 
practical insights into fisheries management. In terms of theory the developing 
literature dealing with common pool resources emphasises community solidarity as a 
means of providing effective ‘self management’. In practice, while fisheries may be 
fragmented and a unified view difficult to ascertain, the role of industry self-
management is an integral component in ensuring compliance with both externally 
imposed management arrangements and community based codes of practice. 
Compliance with management measures is clearly more likely when these measures 
can be shown to directly benefit the fisher’s economic performance. Fisheries in New 
Zealand have been regulated with the use of market-based tools, although there is now 
a shift towards voluntary approaches and self management of activities in the EEZ 
(see later). 
 
New Zealand Fisheries Management 
New Zealand followed the traditional pattern, common to other jurisdictions, of 
enacting sectoral-based legislation to govern use of resources in, and protection of, the 
marine and coastal environment. These legislative and administrative arrangements 
were seen as considerable constraints on policy development and implementation, 
‘leading to gaps, overlaps and inefficiencies’ (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 1999, preface).  
 
In 1983 amendments to the Fisheries Act introduced far-reaching changes. As part of 
this reform to fisheries management the introduction of the quota management system 
(QMS) occurred with a trial based on a developmental deep-water fishery in 1983 
(Wallace and Weeber 2005, 516). From this initial model the QMS was introduced 
more broadly in inshore fisheries in 1986 (Wallace and Weeber 2005, 516). The New 
Zealand QMS was designed to address two motivations (Connor 2004, 181): first the 
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desire to reduce pressure on stocks in inshore fisheries and second ‘the desire for a 
mechanism to allow the domestic industry to capture rents and build capacity in the 
offshore sector’ (Connor 2004, 181). The latter was achieved by encouraging joint 
ventures between New Zealand and foreign companies, leading to a rapid 
development in offshore and deep-water fishery skills and capacity. New Zealand 
interests took opportunities to purchase deep-sea trawlers from United Kingdom 
companies, themselves subject to increasing constraints within the European Union, 
for the developing orange roughy fishery in the early 1980s. 
 
These market type arrangements have encouraged the introduction of corporate 
models of governance in New Zealand fisheries, with quota association ‘companies’ 
taking the place of traditional associations or councils. The Orange Roughy 
Management Company, for example, was formed in 1991, and the Hoki Fisher 
Management Company was formed in 1997 (Wallace and Weeber 2005, 518). In its 
extreme form the use of tradeable rights and the creation of quasi-market approaches 
by such ‘trades’ in fisheries management tackles the ‘tragedy of the commons’ by 
creating private property regimes, based on what have been termed ‘privatarian’ 
approaches to common pool resources (Haward and Wilson 2000).  The development 
of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) creates quasi property rights, provides an 
opportunity to utilise market mechanisms and allows the market to determine the 
value of the quota or its component ‘units’. Setting the total allowable catch (TAC) 
and determining quota and unit shares of the TAC provides a powerful tool for 
fisheries managers in the control of fishing effort and ‘technology creep’.  One effect 
has been to increase the direct interest and involvement of fishers in the management 
of their fisheries and help (Haward and Wilson 2000) and enhance the network nature 
of governance. As Ferguson has recognised the emphasis on the tragedy of commons 
‘deflects analytic attention away from the actual socio-organizational arrangements 
able to overcome resource degradation and make common property regimes viable’ 
(Ferguson 1997, 295). 
 
The introduction of the QMS was not without its controversy and its critics. The 
introduction of quota-based fisheries have been criticized for first privatising what has 
been a common pool resource, and second for not adequately returning resource rents 
to the broader community. In New Zealand claims for Maori to access fisheries 
entitlements, and challenges to initial resource rental charges (Wallace and Weeber 
2005, 519) led to court action with the dispute settled with Maori gaining an initial ten 
per cent quota allocation, ‘a promise of 20 percent of future allocations and a half 
share in a large quota holding company, Sealords’ (Wallace and Weeber 2005, 519).   
 
New Zealand also implemented major administrative reforms and legislative change 
affecting management of terrestrial (including coastal) environments and resources. 
The Resource Management Act (RMA) enacted in 1991 was the culmination of ‘a 
massive legislative and administrative reform process as the question of “sustainable 
development” increased in political salience’ (Haward 1995, 104). The reform process 
preceding the introduction of the RMA was ‘unprecedented’, with the proposed 
legislation subject to almost four years of development, formal legislative review and 
public consultation. The RMA achieved bi-partisan political support. Initially 
proposed by the Labour Party (in power between 1984 and 1990), the RMA was 
enacted by a newly elected National Party government.  The scope of the process and 
its outcomes were staggering, the RMA saw 700 statutory bodies in such diverse areas 
 6 
as harbour management trusts and drainage boards abolished, and 167 separate pieces 
of legislation revoked (Haward 1995, 103-104).  
 
The RMA provided the framework or architecture for development of major national 
resource and environmental management polices, although a major weakness was the 
failure to include fisheries within the RMA framework. The RMA dealt with 
Aquaculture by providing the framework for resource consent (occupation of space) 
whilst the Fisheries Act 1983 gave provision for marine farming permits. Under this 
joint legislative approach ‘marine farmers require both a resource consent from the 
relevant regional council (under the RMA) and a marine farming permit from the 
Ministry of Fisheries (granted under the Fisheries Act)’ (Gibbs and Woods 2003). The 
coastal permits of farms that have joint permits can be reviewed under the 
Aquaculture Reform (Repeals and Transitional Provisions) Act 2004 (see Ministry for 
the Environment, Ministry of Fisheries and Department of Conservation 2006). 
Aquaculture is the fastest growing seafood industry in New Zealand (New Zealand 
Aquaculture Council 2006). 
 
Developing an Oceans Policy  
The development of an oceans policy in New Zealand resulted from an ad hoc 
collection of regulations and legislation dealing with the ocean domain. The focus of 
the oceans policy process was based on ‘integration’ and ‘holistic’ approaches to 
regulation. Community and market approaches were intertwined with this regulatory 
process to address the sectoral needs.   
 
This process began following the New Zealand election of 27th November 1999 when 
a new Labour government took office. Early support for action on management of 
New Zealand’s marine jurisdiction occurred with the release of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment report – Setting Course for a Sustainable Future: 
The Management of New Zealand’ Marine Environment – in December 1999 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 1999). This report has been seen 
as ‘probably the most influential motivator for the New Zealand government to 
undertake the development of an Oceans policy for its marine environment’ (Foster 
2002, 16). The Commissioner’s recommendation to develop an oceans policy was 
reflected in the observation that ‘[a] much more cohesive government approach to 
marine management is urgently required’ (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment 1999, preface). The Commissioner commented 
 
We have an extraordinary plethora of legislation and agencies with marine 
responsibilities. There are 18 main statutes, 14 agencies and six government 
strategies for marine management. We have also signed up to at least 13 
international conventions with marine implications (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment 1999, preface). 
 
In March 2000 the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy was released. In the same 
month the Minister for Environment was tasked by Cabinet with responsibility for 
developing an oceans policy (Mansell 2004, 5). New Zealand then sent a 
representative to participate in ‘Towards a Regional Marine Plan for the South East’ 
National Oceans Forum held in Hobart, Tasmania in April 2000.  Cozens argued that 
Australia’s Oceans Policy at the time provided New Zealand a ‘point of reference, 
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giving guidance and principles of direction, to national and local policy makers…’ 
(Cozens 2000, 18). 
 
In July 2000 an ad hoc Ministerial Group of six ministers with responsibilities for 
economic and environmental matters affecting New Zealand’s ocean domain was 
formed. This Ministerial Group was Chaired by the Minister of Energy, Fisheries, and 
Research Science and Technology and comprised Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Conservation, Maori Affairs, Commerce, and Environment (Foster 2002, 17). 
It was asserted that ‘collectively these Ministers have responsibility for economic and 
environmental outcomes in relation to the marine environment and Treaty of Waitangi 
considerations, reflecting the need for the policy to address these considerations’ 
(MACOP 2001, 10). An Ocean Policy Secretariat was also established. The 
Secretariat was ‘a group of officials who continue to work in their respective agencies 
and are coordinated by the Minister for the Environment’s office’ to oversee and 
support ocean policy development (Mansell 2004, 11; Foster 2002, 17-19). In short a 
‘whole of government approach’ to improve integration across sectors was sought by 
the New Zealand government. 
 
The ‘scope of the project was approved by Cabinet’ on 18 September 2000 (Mansell 
2004, 6; Foster 2002, 18), and the New Zealand government announced the 
development of a national Oceans Policy. This initiative was spearheaded by 
deliberations of the Cabinet Policy Committee in July 2000 that dealt with the 
proposal for an ocean policy, noted impetus for oceans policy deriving from 
international and domestic drivers and in passing included developments in Australia 
and Canada (Foster 2002, 17; Vince 2008).  
 
The relationship between Maori, the Treaty of Waitangi and coastal and ocean areas 
and resources was ‘a key policy consideration’ (Mansell 2004, 10). It was recognised 
that the policy development process needed to ensure that Maori interests were 
respected, and that they were involved and engaged in ‘all levels of participation’ in 
the process.  As Mansell notes these were ‘particularly poignant pleas in light of 
subsequent events surrounding the foreshore and seabed where these values were 
noticeably absent’ (Mansell 2004, 10).   
 
The Process and the Policy 
The New Zealand government proposed developing the policy in three stages: 
 
• Defining the Vision – consulting the community over the values placed 
on the marine environment 
• Design the Vision – designing policies to achieve the vision set out by 
Zealanders in the first stage  
• Deliver the Vision – implementing the policy (Ministry of Fisheries 
press release 6 July 2001; Mansell 2004, 6). 
 
The first stage was to be facilitated by an eight person Ministerial Advisory 
Committee (MAC) chaired by Dame Catherine Tizard. Dame Catherine was a former 
New Zealand Governor-General (13 December 1990 – 21 March 1996). The MAC 
was involved in an extensive period of consultation with New Zealanders ‘to find out 
what local people value about the oceans’ (Ministry of Fisheries press release 6 July 
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2001).  The MAC believed that the oceans policy provided a means to ‘manage 
conflicts between different management regimes’ (MACOP 2001, 11).   
 
The New Zealand oceans policy process was characterised by a focus on public 
consultation. Forty-seven meetings and 24 hui were held across New Zealand, 
including meetings on Stewart Island and on Chatham Island from 25 June to 13 
August 2001. Over 2,000 people attended these meetings, with 1,160 written 
submissions being received by the MAC and 300,000 downloads from the MAC 
consultation website (MACOP 2001). Eight hundred submissions (69 per cent of 
total) were individual submissions and there were a total of 360 submissions (31 per 
cent of total) from groups – ranging in size from two to 31,000 members. The MAC 
was required to report to the oceans policy Ministerial Group on the results of the 
consultation by 30 September 2001. The consultation process was extensive and 
significant, with the MAC’s report providing useful ‘insights’ from the consultation.  
Importantly these insights included discussion of ‘consultation overload’, and a 
degree of cynicism in the effect of consultation.  It also identified the problems of 
‘consultation fatigue’ among Maori, and concern at the lack of co-ordination among 
government consultation processes (MACOP 2001, 44).  
 
The MAC emphasised New Zealanders’ links to the coastal and marine environment, 
with the nation’s physical setting as a group of islands in ‘a corner to the world’s 
largest ocean’ (MACOP 2001, 15) giving its people a close connection to the sea. The 
MAC noted the spiritual and physical connection Maori placed on their relationship to 
the oceans, and the need for Oceans Policy to recognise and incorporate tangata 
whenua – the Maori world view. The MAC noted the importance placed on ‘a healthy 
sea’ as the basis for the oceans policy by many contributors to the consultation. The 
MAC also noted that in addition to providing an essential resource the ‘oceans also 
support a complex infrastructure that a modern society and economy need to function’ 
(MACOP 2001, 27). This focused the MAC to establish the link between oceans 
policy and ‘a healthy society’. The development of the vision underpinning New 
Zealand’s oceans policy was encapsulated in the statement ‘Healthy Oceans: New 
Zealanders understand marine life and marine processes and, accordingly take 
responsibility for wisely managing the health of the ocean and its contribution to the 
present and future social, cultural, environmental and economic well being of New 
Zealand’ (Mansell 2004, 6). This statement was shortened and adopted by Cabinet as 
‘healthy oceans, wisely managed for the greatest benefit to New Zealand, now and in 
the future’ (Benson-Pope 2005, 2).  
 
Developing the Oceans Policy 
In the early months of 2002, the challenge for the New Zealand government was to 
keep stakeholders involved in oceans policy development. In February, the Minister 
for Fisheries, Pete Hodgson addressed the Ngai Tahu Waipounamu Treaty Festival 
and outlined the key issues for stage two of policy development. These included: 
integrated management, the need for holistic management systems, and voluntary 
compliance (Hodgson 2002). 
 
Other key issues included decision making models; the co-existence of the oceans 
policy and Treaty of Waitangi; the development of an information management 
framework; and policy monitoring (Hodgson 2002).  The Oceans Policy Secretariat 
focused on addressing these issues. They commissioned Enfocus Ltd, URS New 
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Zealand and Hill Young Cooper to prepare a ‘stocktake’ of the oceans in November 
2002 (Enfocus Ltd et al 2002). The purpose of this research was to provide an 
overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the oceans management approaches in 
New Zealand. Second, it examined key themes across legislation. Unlike Australia 
and Canada’s state and provincial issues integrating approaches across jurisdictions, 
New Zealand’s focus was on the extent of legislative cohesion on ocean issues. The 
report concluded that the legal instruments and government strategies have ‘no 
unifying thread or theme’ and that ‘each has been developed for a different purpose 
and therefore has a different utility’ (Enfocus Ltd et al 2002, 43).  
 
On 14 March 2003 the Ocean Policy Secretariat released a series of 11 working 
papers on issues as part of the second stage of the ocean policy process. Meetings 
were held in Auckland and Wellington in late March 2003 with a hui also held in 
Wellington. The Ocean policy Secretariat provided a document summarising feedback 
from the meeting and from written comment in April 2003 (Oceans Policy Secretariat 
2003).  
 
The following institutional arrangements were suggested in 2003:  
• Ad Hoc Ministerial Group;  
• Oceans Policy External Reference Group;  
• Officials Steering Group;  
• Oceans Policy Secretariat;  
• Working Groups;  
• Oceans Policy Group Chair; and  
• Departmental Reference Group (New Zealand, 2003).  
 
In May 2003, the research report Oceans Management at the Local Level produced 
for the Oceans Policy Secretariat by Enfocus Ltd. summarized the findings of surveys 
completed by local authorities and Department of Conservation conservancies. This 
report was indicative of the ‘bottom-up’ approach to implementation being pursued by 
the Secretariat. Following this, on the 30th June 2003, the Centre for Advanced 
Engineering released a report prepared for the Secretariat titled Economic 
Opportunities in New Zealand’s Oceans: Informing the Development of Oceans 
Policy. The myriad of reports released by the Oceans Secretariat up until 2003 
demonstrated their thoroughness and aim to ‘leave no stone unturned’ in oceans 
policy development. The work undertaken from 2000-2003 in New Zealand provided 
an important base to oceans policy development and implementation.  
 
Oceans Policy: Shoals, Squalls and the Question of Foreshore and Seabed Title 
The policy development process was abruptly terminated in mid 2003. Following the 
New Zealand Court of appeals decision in Ngati Apa, Ngati Koata & Ors v Ki Te Tua 
Ihu Trust & Ors (the Ngati Apa case) in June 2003 the New Zealand government took 
the view that issues regarding the ownership of the foreshore and seabed between the 
Maori and the Crown needed to be resolved before any further oceans policy 
development continued. The Ngati Apa case saw a longstanding legal precedent 
relating to status of Maori title over coastal and seabed areas challenged by the Court 
of Appeal. The decision in the Ninety Mile Beach case ([1963] NZLR 261) decided in 
1963 ‘shut down Maori claims to customary title in the foreshore by ruling that any 
customary interests in the foreshore and seabed were extinguished by implication, if 
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the adjoining dry lands were investigated by the Native Land Court, the Maori Land 
Court’s predecessor’ (Charters and Erueti 2005, 261). 
 
The principal legal question was whether the Maori Land Court had the authority to 
exercise jurisdiction in relation to the foreshore and seabed (Charters and Erueti 
2005). The Court of Appeal found that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction, with 
the court also overturning the decision in the Ninety Mile Beach case. Soon after the 
Court of appeal decision the New Zealand government ‘announced that it would 
introduce legislation to overrule the decision’ (Charters and Erueti 2005, 262). 
 
In August 2003 the government announced that it was proposing legislation that 
would ‘declare the entire foreshore and seabed public domain, guarantee a general 
right of access along the foreshore’ and alter the Maori Land Court’s jurisdiction 
(Charters and Erueti 2005, 262). The Foreshore and Seabed Bill was introduced into 
the New Zealand parliament in early 2004.  Prior to this the matter had been taken up 
by the Waitangi Tribunal that gave strong criticisms over both the policy 
underpinning the proposed legislation and process undertaken by the government. In 
July 2004 Maori organisations submitted a request to the United Nations Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to review the Bill. 
 
The Bill was referred to a select committee that invited public submission. The select 
committee could not agree on amendments to the Bill, being ‘sharply divided along 
party lines’ (Charters and Erueti 2005, 264), although ‘substantial amendments’ were 
presented when the Bill returned to parliament for a second reading on 16 November 
2004 (Charters and Erueti 2005, 264). The Foreshore and Seabed Act, a landmark 
piece of legislation in New Zealand’s history of conflict over land ownership, was 
finally enacted on 24 November 2004. The United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, although its decisions are not enforceable 
against New Zealand (Charters and Erueti 2005), brought down its decision in March 
2005, determining that the Foreshore and Seabed Act discriminates against Maori. 
This determination was rejected and opposed by the New Zealand Government.  The 
lack of resolution over Maori concerns is likely to shape oceans governance debates 
into the future.  The Minister, perhaps responding to the acrimonious political and 
public debate over the Foreshore and Seabed Act, stated that his intension ‘for the 
development of oceans policy to continue to be an inclusive process’ (Benson-Pope 
2005, 2). 
 
New Zealand’s Ocean Policy: Implementing a Framework  
On the 11 February, 19 March and 4 June 2004, the Ministry of Environment held 
informal workshops to ‘test ideas’ on oceans policy priority. Participants included 
representatives from government agencies, consultants and NGOs. The outcomes of 
these workshops were summarised in two papers - Getting Our Priorities Right: The 
Role of Information in Setting Priorities for Management of New Zealand’s Ocean 
and Offshore Options: Managing Environmental Effects in New Zealand’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone - which were both released in June 2005 by the Ministry for the 
Environment. The Priorities paper began by referring to the Draft Oceans Policy, 
which at the time was yet to be passed by Cabinet. It stated that it is ‘a first step 
towards identifying a preferred, adaptive approach for setting future ocean priorities, 
together with specific actions needed to build information, tools and concepts that 
might underpin this approach’ (Ministry for the Environment 2005, vi).  
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The Offshore Options paper focused on current environmental legislation in the EEZ 
and management gaps; international environmental management of activities in the 
EEZ; and options for improving the environmental management in the EEZ (Ministry 
for the Environment 2005). Of the latter, it identified four options for improving 
environmental management: 
 
• Option 1 – the voluntary approach: government would work with 
industries operating in the EEZ to develop appropriate environmental 
management procedures. Compliance with these procedures would 
be voluntary (at least initially). 
• Option 2 – filling the gaps in current legislation: this would 
involve putting in place new legislation to cover activities not 
already covered, and improving the environmental management 
provisions of existing legislation as necessary. 
• Option 3 – one Act to manage all resources in the EEZ: all of the 
current legislation applying in the EEZ would be replaced by one Act 
controlling resource management (including the allocation of 
resources and/or management of their effects) in the EEZ. 
• Option 4 – an ‘umbrella’ Act: a new statute would be developed 
requiring environmental assessments to be carried out for all 
activities with potentially significant environmental effects (similar 
to the approach taken under Australia’s Environmental Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999). Detailed regulation of 
specific activities through existing legislation would continue 
(Ministry for the Environment 2005, v). 
 
The Ministry for the Environment recommended in the paper that a voluntary 
approach be taken along with the development of an ‘umbrella Act’. Interestingly, the 
voluntary approach was reflective of the aims highlighted by Hodgson in 2002. The 
Offshore Options paper instigated the new approach of the third stage of oceans policy 
implementation.   
 
On the 21st November 2005 the Seachange 05: Managing our Coastal Waters and 
Oceans Conference was held in Auckland. This conference was organised by the EDS 
with the aim to, ‘evaluate recent national policy developments affecting the 
management for New Zealand’s coastal and marine areas’ (EDS 2005). EDS had 
undertaken its own analysis of oceans policy initiatives in Australia, Canada, and the 
USA to help inform and focus on issues facing new Zealand’s development of ‘an 
effective oceans policy’ (EDS 2005; see also Peart 2005). A key speech from the New 
Zealand Minister for the Environment, the Hon David Benson-Pope announced that 
the Oceans Policy development process had resumed.   
 
The recommencement of the oceans policy resulted in a change to the original plans 
for the third implementation stage. The Offshore Options paper steered the direction 
of the oceans policy from a widely focussed plan to one targeting the management of 
New Zealand’s EEZ. The New Zealand Government had ‘agreed that oceans policy 
development will focus on fixing the most pressing marine problems in the short term 
while taking amore coordinated and integrated approach to marine management over 
time’ (Ministry for the Environment, 2007). The decisions dealing with marine issues 
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are to be made within the scope of the Draft Oceans Policy Framework, a one page 
overview of the ‘vision’, ‘conditions’, ‘operating principles’ and ‘process principles’ 
that will guide the sustainable development of New Zealand’s oceans (Ministry of the 
Environment 2007).  
 
As recommended by the Ministry for the Environment in the Offshore Options paper, 
voluntary approaches to managing the environmental impacts of marine activities in 
the EEZ were developed. This form of self-regulation enables those involved in these 
activities to have responsibility and control over their actions. In March 2006, the 
Environmental Best Practice Guidelines for the Offshore Petroleum Industry paper 
was released and it stated that ‘until there is an oceans policy, industry and 
government agree to voluntary principles to manage environmental impacts beyond 
New Zealand’s territorial sea’ (Ministry for the Environment 2006, 2). 
 
In August 2007, the first step towards a legislative component to the oceans policy 
was explored through the release of the discussion paper Improving Regulation of 
Environmental effects in New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (Ministry for the 
Environment 2007). The paper was open for public comment until 30 September 
2007, with a summary of submissions flagged to be released during late November. 
This Discussion paper identified two different options for legislative change to the 
Offshore Options paper. Instead of an ‘umbrella Act’, the Discussion paper 
recommended: 
• Option 1: the establishment of legislative mechanisms focused on filling 
key gaps in EEZ environmental regulation and promoting a consistent 
approach across statues, including the assessment of cumulative effects. 
• Option 2: Develop an entirely new regime for managing all activities in the 
EEZ (Ministry of the Environment 2007, 10). 
Whilst these options are open for public comment, the Discussion paper emphasised 
that the ‘preferred option’ would be option 1, to fill in the key gaps in existing 
legislation. The paper outlined some key questions to be considered if this option 
were to be implemented, including: ‘who should make the final decisions on 1) rules, 
2) applications? The minister, the administering department or an independent 
agency?’ (Ministry of the Environment 2007, 21). In addition, there was a call for 
discussion to whether an existing agency or a new agency be developed to administer 
the legislation. Ironically, this is a similar debate that was held during the 
development of the oceans policy and the Oceans Secretariat. The options are 
currently being considered by Cabinet. 
 
Conclusion 
At one level one can mount an argument that the New Zealand experience reinforces 
the fact that much policy work was reactive, responding to political agendas set by 
government through election promises or program commitments, or responding to 
issues forced onto the political agenda by the pace of events. This argument is 
supported by the rapid pace of development following the October 1999 election, and 
more starkly the government’s decision to abandon this process following the Ngati 
Apa case, and its and actions that led to the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. 
 
The development of fisheries and oceans policies has also demonstrated the complex 
interactions between different groups of actors such as the fishing industry, the Maori 
and the New Zealand government. The stalling of the development of the policy in 
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2003 provided a pause to refocus the direction of the oceans policy. However, this 
pause also ceased the initial momentum and enthusiasm that the development of the 
policy generated. Beggs and Hooper (2005) rightly claim that ‘development of New 
Zealand’s oceans policy has been ambitious and visionary’, yet ‘progress has been 
comprised by several “too hard” issues’. Sectoral integration and holistic approaches 
became ‘too hard issues’ and resulted in one area of focus for the oceans policy at a 
time (currently EEZ environmental management). This has also left the oceans policy 
at the ‘lee shore’ rather than in a ‘safe harbour’. While the policy process has moved 
on, important and unresolved issues (such as Maori land issues) remain.  
 
The focus on voluntary and self-management approaches to manage environmental 
impacts within New Zealand’s EEZ reveals a shift from the use of market based tools 
towards community and co-management forms of governance. While market tools 
and regulation remain dominant approaches in the management of New Zealand’s 
ocean and marine resources, co-management and other community forms of 
governance may become more prevalent in future policy development. This policy 
development is likely to occur in the following areas: aquaculture; Maori involvement 
in fisheries and oceans management; and deep seabed exploration (if New Zealand’s 
application claim for the extension of the Continental Shelf is accepted by the UN's 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf – see Easton 2008). 
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